The Practices of Political Patronage and Clientelism of the Democrat Party in the 2014 Legislative Election in Ponorogo Regency by FIKRI, HAIDAR
 http://dx.doi.org/10.18196/jgp.2017.0056.467-492 
  
 
The Practices of Political 
Patronage and Clientelism of 
the Democrat Party in the 2014 
Legislative Election in 
Ponorogo Regency 
 
 
HAIDAR FIKRI 
Public Administration Master, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences 
Sebelas Maret University 
E-mail: haidarfikri@student.uns.ac.id 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Democrat Party in Ponorogo Regency still exists despite cases of corruption 
that ensnared some national political actors. The Ponorogo Regency attracted 
the attention of many parties and candidates, including that of the Democratic 
Party, during the legislative elections in 2014. This concern included candidate 
efforts to transform the party through the provision of patronage material in 
diverse forms such as a unique distribution process, and a variety of patronage 
models. This research was conducted to determine the practice of patronage 
politics of the Democrat Party in the Ponorogo Regency in 2014. The theory used 
for this research on the practice of patronage is the theory of patronage and 
clientelism according to the variables offered by James Scott. The qualitative 
research methods are data collection interviews, and documentation and re- 
ports related to the elections in Ponorogo. The results of this study suggest that 
the practice of patronage in Ponorogo conducted by the Democrat’s candidate 
is very diverse, ranging from the use of money given to voters, the provision of 
public goods targeting social groups such as farmers and youth organizations 
on the assumption that they were impressionable on an emotional level, and 
giving pork barrels in the form of road construction and irrigation disbursed 
through the BKAD (Inter-agency Cooperation Board). Patronage is certainly dis- 
tributed through clientelism networks such as successful teams that have been 
prepared since before the election, a network of social groups that utilize a warok, 
considered a person who has a wise and exalted nature and takes advantage of 
the village elite. This is a political machine that runs a network to help distribute 
patronage so that it becomes clientelistic. The interest of this study is the associa- 
tion between patronage and clientelism that is fused with the local culture of the 
Ponorogo community and was mobilized in the legislative election in 2014. 
Keywords: Clientelism, legislative elections 2014, patronage, warok 
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ABSTRAK 
Partai Demokrat di Kabupaten Ponorogo masih ada meski terjadi kasus korupsi yang 
menjerat beberapa pelaku politik nasional. Kabupaten Ponorogo menarik perhatian banyak 
pihak dan kandidat, termasuk Partai Demokrat, saat pemilihan legislatif pada 2014. 
Perhatian ini termasuk upaya kandidat untuk mengubah partai melalui penyediaan materi 
patronase dalam berbagai bentuk seperti proses distribusi yang unik, dan berbagai model 
patronase. Penelitian ini dilakukan untuk mengetahui praktik politik patronase Partai 
Demokrat di Kabupaten Ponorogo pada tahun 2014. Teori yang digunakan untuk penelitian 
ini mengenai praktik patronase adalah teori patronase dan clientelism sesuai dengan 
variabel yang ditawarkan oleh James Scott. Metode penelitian kualitatif menggunakan 
wawancara pendataan, dan dokumentasi dan laporan yang berkaitan dengan pemilihan 
di Ponorogo. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa praktik patronase di Ponorogo yang 
dilakukan oleh calon Demokrat sangat beragam, mulai dari penggunaan uang yang 
diberikan kepada pemilih, penyediaan barang publik yang menargetkan kelompok sosial 
seperti petani dan organisasi pemuda dengan asumsi bahwa mereka mudah terpengaruh 
pada tingkat emosional, dan berupa konstruksi jalan dan irigasi yang disalurkan melalui 
BKAD (Badan Kerjasama Antar-Lembaga). Patronase ini pastinya didistribusikan melalui 
jaringan clientelism seperti tim sukses yang telah dipersiapkan sejak sebelum pemilihan, 
jaringan kelompok sosial yang memanfaatkan warok, dianggap sebagai orang yang 
memiliki sifat bijak dan agung dan memanfaatkan elit desa. Perilaku tersebut adalah 
mesin politik yang menjalankan jaringan untuk membantu penyebaran patronase sehingga 
menjadi clientelistic. Ketertarikan dari penelitian ini adalah hubungan antara patronase 
dan clientelisme yang menyatu dengan budaya lokal masyarakat Ponorogo dan dimobilisasi 
dalam pemilihan legislatif pada tahun 2014. 
Kata kunci: Clientelisme, pemilihan legislative 2014, patronase, warok. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This research describes the practice of patronage politics in 
the Ponorogo Regency, which focuses on the Democrat Party. 
As a newcomer, the Democrat Party is able to bring more color 
to Indonesian politics. The party is seen as a newcomer 
because it was born after the three major parties: Golkar, the 
PDI, and the PPP. The democratic national vote in 2004 and 
2009 increased (kpu.go.id, 2015). The Democrats’ 
achievements over ten years were not repeated in the 2014 
election, as their national vote declined. The decline in votes 
faced by the Democrats was for several reasons, one of which 
was the influence of the cadres involved in corruption cases 
(kompas.com, 2015). Of course, that case has no big impact on 
the achievements of the Democrat Party at the regional level, 
because the Democrat Party can still maintain their existence 
following the 2014 election as researchers focused on the 
Ponorogo Regency. 
The results of Democratic votes at the national level cannot 
 
 
  
 
be separated from the acquisition of votes that came at the re- 
gional level. East Java province is a contributing area for the party 
that brought Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to the presidency 
(detiknews.com, 2015). The Pacitan Regency is utilized by the 
Democrat Party to eap the votes from East Java (kpu.go.id, 2015). 
Of course other factors give affects to other regencies around the 
Pacitan Regency such as Ponorogo Regency, Madiun Regency 
and surrounding areas (rri.co.id, 2015). 
The Ponorogo Regency is the basis of the vote of the 
Democrat Party, because the vote in this district is very stable. 
A stable vote from every election in Ponorogo makes this 
research more focused on the Democrats. What strategy is used 
by legislative candidates and cadres of the Democrat Party to 
maintain their existence on the political stage of the Ponorogo 
Regency? There have been a lot of strategies ranging from good 
strategies to strategies prohibited by law to gain support from 
the community as voters. The new phenomenon that is rooted 
in Indonesian politics is a practice of patronage that is 
increasingly interesting to see, and is even utilized by political 
actors. The practice of patronage politics is one of the most 
common political phenomena in Indonesia in legislative 
elections, presidential elections, and elections of regional 
leaders. 
The patronage politics referred to in this study are various 
forms of exchange of benefits between candidates and the elec- 
torate to gain political support at times of elections, especially in 
the 2014 legislative election in Ponorogo Regency, which were 
focused on the local parliament (DPRD) in Ponorogo Regency 
of the Democrat Party which has managed to sit as a people 
representative. 
The study of patronage politics has actually begun to rise in 
popularity and is popular in Indonesia with various themes re- 
lated to money politics or research that discusses the practice of 
buying votes at democratic elections. Most of these findings look 
at how the political phenomenon that occurred in Indonesia, 
especially after the end of the new order and entering the reform 
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era, reflects more the transactional political process that has the 
most tangible money politics. The embodiment of that money 
politics is like the practice of purchasing votes whenever 
elections are held. The various ways of explaining the benefits 
of candidates to the electorate involve many forms of 
relationship be- tween the candidates and the electorate. “This 
relationship is what is commonly known as “clientelism” 
(Hasrul, 2010). The terms “patronage” and “clientelism” are 
actually still difficult to differentiate; there are some circles that 
equate both these terms and there are also those that distinguish 
between the notion and the concept of both. 
This study has its own characteristics by distinguishing both. 
Patronage and clientelism are distinguished by the researchers 
with a view to clarifying the context of the study. This study is 
not limited to a close relationship between the two, because it 
can be said that the practice of patronage is the distribution of 
materials or certain advantages to supporters or voters that is 
usually facilitated through mechanisms or relationships that are 
clientelistic, such as the existence of the Tim Sukses (SuccessTeam), 
political machines from social networks, and the organizations 
of political parties themselves. Focusing on the main theme or 
the title of this research about patronage politics in the 2014 
legislative elections in the Ponorogo Regency, the researcher pre- 
sents a discussion that explains the relationship between patron- 
age and clientelism within the Democrat Party in the Regency 
district. 
The concept of patronage in social science is in fact still widely 
debated. This is related to understanding the relationship be- 
tween the concept of patronage and clientelism, which still 
causes differences of opinion among social scientists. Some have 
equated the notions of these two concepts, and some distinguish 
between them. In relation to this research alone, the two 
concepts are distinguished from each other. Where the concept 
of patronage is primarily used, that of clientelism supports it to 
provide a good understanding of the political symptoms of 
patronage discussed 
 
 
  
 
in this study. 
Political patronage is the relationship between a patron (a 
person a particular position) and a client (a person in need of 
something) who are mutually beneficial to each other; in the 
political context it is the exchange of suffrage with goods and 
money given by the cadre to the voters (Aspinall,2014; Hein,2010; 
Sadanan dan, 2012; and Scherlis, 2013). Such practices are re- 
ferred to as political practices of kinship that are packaged in 
political patronage (Aspinall, 2014; Hilman, 2013). Indonesia 
because Indonesian people feel they benefit and the candidates 
also enjoy an advantage in terms of votes in the name of patron- 
age politics and actor philanthropy. 
Of course, this situation is not only experienced by new can- 
didates but also by incumbent or old candidates. More patron- 
age politics emerged from the government to exchange policies 
with the people so the candidates could be elected again 
(Hachemaoui, 2013; Kopecky&Scherli, 2008; Arriola, 2009; 
Waddell, 2015; Wigh, 2015). 
This direct exchange on the part of the former government 
was in the form of a policy of an incumbent strategy to gain the 
attention of the public (Alley, 2010; Heperand Keyman,1998). 
These distributions and trucks are provided directly to the com- 
munity but others are provided through the network. Patronage 
conducted directly from patrons to clients without going through 
an intermediary is called “pure patronage” (Aspinall, 2014) while 
gains of patrons and clients through networks or brokers are 
called “patronage politics”and are clientelistic (Aspinall, 2014; 
Hasrul, 2010). 
The clientelistic network is very important in distributing 
profits from candidates to voters (Aspinall, 2014; Auyero, 2000; 
Robinson &Verdier, 2013). Of course, this network is needed 
because the character, culture, and needs in the community that 
most understand is a network or a successful team (Aspinall, 
2014; Auyero, 2000;Hasrul, 2010;Hilman, 2013; Robinson & 
Verdier,2013) 
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This political clientelismis repeatable that is uninterrupted 
after the election, but persists when the candidate is elected 
(Aspinall, 2015; Hasrul, 2010; Hilman, 2013; Hrebenar, 2007; 
Winters, 2016). The practice of political patronage will not be 
perfect when a network is not formed, so this network of 
clientelism needs to distribute something to the community to 
achieve its purpose. 
Research on the politics of patronage and clientelism has been 
carried out but only to see how the practice of political patron- 
age in elections and clientelism can be seen in isolation from 
the perspective of elections. Such research in cludes 
Jovano Deivid Oleyver, titled “The Application of Political 
Patron- age in Victory of Justice and Unity Party Indonesia in 
the Legis- lative Election of Bitung City in 2009.” This research 
was con- ducted in 2014, with the use of patron-client theory in 
collaboration with distributive political theory to discuss the 
victory of the Justice Party and Indonesian unity in the 
Legislative election in Bitung City in 2009. This is the 
difference with the research itself, where the concept of 
patronage is specifically combined with the concept of 
clientelism. In addition, differences are also found in the 
patron-client framework itself, where the highlight of the study 
emphasizes the practice of vote buying, pork-barrel- ing, and 
constituency service, while this research further system- atizes 
the distribution in a broader classification and refers to the 
distribution of variations of patronage forms of Aspinall and 
Sukmajati. While the equation itself is more about the main 
theme that is discussed specifically to see the symptoms of pa- 
tronage politics in the event of a legislative election, the type of 
research used is also the same as qualitative research. 
While the research of Nurfaizin on the Kroni Santri Patron- 
age Relationship Collapse in Local Political Space (Study on 
Regional Election of Pamekasan Regency in 2013) has a 
similar research theme, i.e. patronage, the scope taken in 
patronage in the research is more between santri and kiai with 
the case study in the Pamekasan Regency. This is in contrast to 
this study, which 
 
 
  
 
focuses more on patronage in legislative elections in relation to 
legislative candidates with voters in the Ponorogo Regency, espe- 
cially for candidates of Regency/City DPRD from the 
Democrat Party. 
From the two previous studies above, in particular this 
study,the revealing of various forms of patronage politics refers 
to the distribution of variations of patronage forms expressed by 
Aspinall and Sukmajati (2015). The distribution of variations of 
patronage forms expressed by Aspinall and Sukmajati includes 
five forms, namely vote buying, individual gifts, services and ac- 
tivities, club goods, and pork barrel projects. Of course, the con- 
cept of patronage in this study is not patronage alone but rather 
a look at clientelism in accordance with Aspinall and 
Sukmajati (2014). The purpose of this research is to the 
concept of patron- age and clientelism because these two 
things have never been used by other researchers to visualize 
the political problems in Indonesia. 
 
THEORETICAL REVIEW 
POLITICAL PATRONAGE 
The notion of the concept of patronage in social science is in 
fact still widely debated. This is related to understanding the 
relationship between the concept of patronage and 
clientelism, which still causes differences of opinion among so- 
cial scientists. Some have equated the notions of these two con- 
cepts, and some distinguish between them. In relation to this 
research alone, the two concepts are distinguished from each 
other,with the concept of patronage being primarily used, and 
the concept of clientelism in support to provide a good under- 
standing of the patronage political symptoms discussed in this 
study. This section will discuss the concept of patronage, and 
afterwards the concept of clientelism will be presented in the 
next section. 
In relation to the context of this research, we can see how this 
patronage relationship becomes a form of profit exchange or dis- 
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tribution of profits that is expected to provide support or votes 
from those given to profit-giving politicians. Because the patron- 
age form is done with diverse expectations for the replies of the 
distribution as described: “Political parties, party factions, indi- 
vidual politicians expect the following rewards from patronage: 
votes, energy, money, strategy flexibility, and retrieval capacity 
policy” (Muller and Vousden, 2014). 
Specifically in this study, revealing various forms of patron- 
age politics refers to the distribution of variations of patronage 
forms expressed by Aspinall and Sukmajati (2015). The distribu- 
tion of variations of patronage forms revealed by Aspinall and 
Sukmajati includes five forms, namely vote buying, individual 
gifts, services and activities, club goods, and pork barrel projects. 
Variations of this form of patronage will be explained by defin- 
ing and classifying each one as follows: 
Vote buying is the systematic distribution of cash payments 
from candidates to voters within days of an election accompa- 
nied by an implicit expectation that the recipients will respond 
by voting for the giver (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2015). In prac- 
tice, patronage actions that are classified in terms of vote pur- 
chases by these candidates are usually performed systematically 
using mobilization networks, or can also be regarded as useful 
waysto record the voters and later to distribute money/goods to 
voters. Apart from the patronage form of vote buying, there is 
also patronage in the form of private gifts (Aspinall, 2014). 
Individual gifts are usually patronage practices undertaken to 
support sound purchasing practices to be more systematic. This 
is done by giving certain forms of gifts in person. These personal 
gifts are often described as glossy social relationships, such as 
giving personal gifts such as souvenirs (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 
2015). The classification of the practice of providing personal 
items is actually very difficult to distinguish from sound buying 
practices. Therefore, according to Aspinall and Sukmajati, the 
practice of giving personal goods can be categorized into several 
parts, namely giving in the form of small objects (such as calen- 
 
 
  
 
dars and keychains), foodstuffs, and other small objects that have 
religious significance (such as fabrics, household appliances, 
hijabs, mukenas and prayer rugs). Furthermore, in addition to 
vote purchases and personal grants, this form of patronage can 
also be in the form of services and activities. 
Service and activity is a form of patronage practice by provid- 
ing or financing various forms of activities and services for vot- 
ers. In general, the form of activity that is most often performed 
by candidates or party politicians is campaigning during a cel- 
ebration of a particular community. Other examples of this in- 
clude sporting events, chess or dominos tournaments, recitation 
forums, cooking demonstrations, group singing, parties organized 
by the community, etc. (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2015). In 
addi- tion to these forms of activities, the forms of service to the 
com- munity include a variety of free health services such as 
free am- bulances and checkups, as well as garbage collection, 
and many other forms of service. 
In addition to services and activities, another form of patron- 
age is the provision of group items. Club goods are patronage 
practices aimed at providing benefits to a particular group of 
people or social groups, not just individual benefits. Club goods 
in practice in Indonesia can be divided into two categories: do- 
nations to community associations and donations to communi- 
ties living in urban, rural, or other environments (Aspinall and 
Sukmajati, 2015). 
Usually, most politicians or parties feel that the strategy of 
providing benefits in the form of group items to a particular 
community is less effective because of the reciprocal elements 
that have been discussed earlier. Therefore, the provision of these 
public goods is usually done with the strong support of commu- 
nity leaders who have an influence on the groups to which these 
goods are distributed. So the expected reciprocity in the form of 
support on election day becomes more convincing because of 
the community leaders who are heard and obeyed by the voters 
coming from the beneficiary community. In addition to several 
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forms of distribution of profits in the patronage that has been 
described above, the last form of patronage expressed by Aspinall 
and Sukmajati (2015) is in the form of pork barrel projects. 
In addition, aspiration funds, which are usually provided to 
the legislature and are intended as funds to be used by legisla- 
tors in response to constituent or community aspirations, are 
usually used by incumbents for this purpose. Where projects are 
awarded by legislators to the community with the aim of the 
community choosing the candidate again at the next 
election. In fact, the community groups in certain 
geographical areas that have received pork barrel profits are 
included in campaign teams. Another form of this is where the 
candidate provides payments to the members of the Success 
Team and provides other benefits that are more clientelical 
and more sustainable, such as providing employment or 
assistance to obtain allocation of government projects 
(Aspinall, Davidsonand Weiss, 2016). In Aspinall and 
Sukmajati’s research on the 2014 legislative election, they saw 
that there was a reciprocal relationship between patronage and 
electoral fraud. Whereas in some studies, election fraud is 
sometimes regarded as an alternative to patronage, based on 
the research they conducted, Aspinall and Sukmajati 
found that election fraud and patronage may be linked. 
Several variations of the patronage form described above are 
referenced from Aspinall and Sukmajati’s (2015) exposure guide- 
lines that are used in this study. The concept of clientelism, which 
will also be used in this study to support the concept of patron- 
age, will be described in the next section. 
 
CLIENTELISM 
In relation to this research, the pattern that is used, or the 
concept of clientelism that is used in this case, refers to the expo- 
sure of Aspinall and Sukmajati’s patronage concept, referred to 
above. Aspinall and Sukmajati refer more to the notion that 
clientelism is a characteristic of the relationship between politi- 
cians and voters or supporters (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2015. 
 
 
  
 
Aspinall and Sukmajati’s exposure referred to research on the 
last elections of 2014 in Indonesia, where when looking at the 
context of the research at the time of the election, the concept of 
clientelism is meant to be both synonymous with the concept of 
new clientelism and with democratic elections. But the subject 
of patrons places more emphasis on individual politicians of 
political parties who are more similar to the pattern of old 
clientelism, although political party politicians are not entirely 
autonomous as in the concept of old clientelism, since politi- 
cians are people who come from political parties that have been 
selected through an internal party mechanism. That means 
that the party is still in control over the individual. 
Furthermore, Aspinall and Sukmajati (in Hicken, 2008) ex- 
plain the definition of clientelism which consists of three things. 
First, contingency or reciprocity: Goods or services of one party 
(patron or client) are a direct response to the reply of the other 
party (Hicken, 2008, p. 291); usually, material sources are ex- 
changed with sound or other forms of political performance. 
Second, hierarchy: There is an emphasis on unequal power rela- 
tionships between patrons and clients. Third, repetition: 
Clientelistic momentum persists (Aspinall, Davidsonand Weiss, 
2016). In Aspinall’s experience with the concept of patronage 
that has been reviewed before, he alluded to the fact that to 
overcome the problem of reciprocity, politicians usually use 
relationships that are clientelistic to launch the practice of 
patronage, because in a clientelistic relationship, patronage is 
not merely a short- term issue with material exchange) between 
a candidate and a voter, but part of a long-term relationship 
that is equalon both sides (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2015). 
Furthermore, in Aspinall and Sukmajati’s presentation of 
clientelism, they describe a clientelistic relationship in the form 
of the vote broker network commonly used in Indonesia, 
where the form of broker network is formulated based on the 
results of research related to money politics in general elections 
or the legislative elections of 2014. The forms of vote broker 
network in 
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this case include three forms of the Success Team networks, so- 
cial networking machines, and political parties. Each of Aspinall 
and Sukmajati’s wise vote brokers are described below: 
The SuccessTeam. The vote broker network that falls into the 
category of the Success Teamis a vote broker network that is com- 
monly used. A variety of titles are usually used, such as, in this 
case,”winning team.” In general, the success teams are usually 
personalized and promote campaigning for individual candidates, 
though often the success teams also work for a number of candi- 
dates in the form of tandem campaigns (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 
2015). The problems that often occur in the success teams that 
create reciprocal problems that should be overcome through the 
use of the success teams are embezzlement, inaction, and fraud 
brokers. Therefore, usually, the politicians or candidates in the 
election are very concerned about these issues. Apart from the 
broker network in the form of the Success Team, there is also a 
broker network in the form of social networking machines. 
The social networking machines in the reviews provided by 
Aspinall and Sukmajati are more like influential community lead- 
ers. It is not uncommon for these public figures to have formal 
positions in government such as village heads and RT/RW heads, 
and they may also be chairmen of formal associations in the 
form of ethnic groups, clubs, including sports clubs, and even 
religious groups. The utilization of community leaders as a social 
networking machine is carried out by candidates in the hope 
that followers of these figures can be encouraged to support it. 
From the two forms of brokerage network that have been dis- 
closed, the success team and brokerage network, Aspinall and 
Sukmajati observe that the broker structure uses at least two dif- 
ferent routes to reach the voters, namely through the Success 
Team (or political party) organized territorially and through the 
social network. Along with the two forms of brokerage 
networks that have been described above, the last brokerage 
network is a political party. 
A political party is a broker network that plays the smallest 
 
 
  
 
role in organizing a grassroots campaign to support the candi- 
date. Political parties are usually used by candidates who are 
members of the party. This means that even if the political party 
turns out to be the most minimal mobile mobilization network, 
it will become effective when based on candidates who are from 
party officials rather than cadres who are not party administra- 
tors. The use of political party cadres to mobilize votes for one of 
the candidates, who are usually the administrators or even party 
chiefs at the local and central level, must be a disadvantage for 
other candidates from the same party who are also competing. 
In relation to this research, the concept of patronage and its 
various forms and clientelism along with the form of mobiliza- 
tion network of voters described above in reference to Aspinall 
and Sukmajati is the concept that is used as the theoretical foun- 
dation in this research. From the above explanation, the re- 
searcher here will also provide a chart that will illustrate these 
two concepts to present a clear picture of the mechanisms of 
patronage or patentee patronage work that will be described as 
being modified from the patron-client cluster and patron-client 
pyramid charts presented by James Scott. 
Although James Scott’s concept was not the main reference 
in the theoretical framework used by the research, the researcher 
felt that the chart could illustrate the patentee patronage and 
patronage framework in this study, with some modifications from 
the researcher to fit the context of this study and to fit the main 
focus of the study: 
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Source: The modification from the patron-client pyramid chart of Scott (1992). 
 
FIGURE 1. PATRONAGE 
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CANDIDAT 
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Figure I provides an explanation of how the pattern or frame- 
work of political patronage is referred to in this study, in which 
the distribution  of profits from the candidates to the  voters is 
480 done  directly  without  the  broker  network, which  is more 
clientelical. The distribution of these benefits can also be to in- 
dividual voters (not personalistic) as well as to specific social 
groups in society. The way of distributing candidates to indi- 
viduals and certain social groups here is more of a one-off rela- 
tionship, as is the distribution of benefits that follow cultural 
values in society to deal with reciprocal issues that have been 
previously reviewed. Distribution can also be to groups or indi- 
viduals who are familiar with the candidate, but have no person- 
alistic relationship with the candidate, only to a casual introduc- 
tion that has no long-term and repetitive value. 
 
 
Source: The modification from the patron-client pyramid chart of Scott (1992). 
FIGURE 2. THE PATRONAGE CHART IS CLIENTELISTIC 
 
Figure 2 explains how the work patterns or mechanism of 
CANDIDAT 
BROKER BROKER 
VOTER VOTER VOTER VOTER 
VOTER 
 
 
  
 
patronage work are clientelistic. Patronage that is clientelistic, as 
can be seen in the chart above, is the distribution of benefits 
through certain mobilization networks such as success teams, 
social networking machines, and political parties themselves. 
Personalistic, hierarchical, and repetitive relationships are usu- 
ally established between candidates and brokers, who serve as a 
winning team or candidate campaign team. The relationship 
between the broker and the voter may also be personalistic, but 
that between the voter and the candidate is not personalistic, 
hierarchical, or repetitive. Therefore, it is said that this patron- 
age is clientelistic. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
The type of research used is descriptive with a qualitative ap- 
proach. The focus of this research is to look at the political prac- 
tices of the Democrat Party in the 2014 election in Ponorogo 
Regency. The location of research in Ponorogo with research sites 
is the Democrat Party of Ponorogo Regency. For data collection, 
researchers used observation techniques, interviewsand documen- 
tation. Qualitative data analysis is usedas proposed by Miles, 
Hubermanand Saldana (2014, p. 33). 
 
DISCUSSION 
THE PATRONAGE PRACTICE OF THEDEMOCRAT PARTY 
IN PONOROGO 
The phenomenon of giving money during the night and even 
early in the morning, which is often called the “dawn attack” by 
the community, is certainly no stranger to elections. In 2009, 
the granting of money in the form of dawn raids was still carried 
out by the candidates and continued with the district electionin 
2010. Continuing into the legislative elections in 2014, this prac- 
tice of giving money is increasingly evident and not coveredup 
completely. Of course, in the 2014 legislative election in the 
Ponorogo Regency it could be called vulgar, because giving 
money was no longer hidden and secret as the cadre through 
the net- 
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work shared the money when the voters went to the polling sta- 
tion. The election was ravaged by candidates who used sound 
purchases in the form of money or goods in the 2014 election in 
the Ponorogo Regency (LSMPRC, 2015). 
This openness of money giving practices is balanced by the 
activities of candidates who approach the community as voters 
by providing goods and social assistance. This occurred during 
the campaign period and even started before the campaign took 
place. Such practices are performed by entering the social activi- 
ties of the community and offering political contracts and social 
assistance. The legislative election in Ponorogo in 2014 targeted 
young people more, who represented many first-time voters. 
Candidates offered a variety of goods to gain the sympathy of 
young people whose activities they had been entered. Besides 
that, the incumbent legislative candidate has more to do with 
the political practice of pig barreling or pork barreling to the 
society of their election area. The project with the above 
candidates was rampant in the legislative election in 2014. 
Assistance in developing the village road and irrigation is 
mostly done by the cadets of incumbent (2015) 
The provision of social assistance to the community conducted 
by Democratic candidates has a target. The candidates’ target is 
young people and women religious study (Interview Commu- 
nity in the Electoral District 1,2015). The purpose and objective 
is to draw the votes of the novice voters and sympathy from among 
the mothers of women religious study. The practice of giving 
goods by the candidate from the Democrats does not stop there 
because they are targeting the preservation culture of the 
Ponorogo Reogby providing assistance to villages and commu- 
nity groups that do not have reog. Farming groups,which domi- 
nate among the community, are also targeted by the candidates 
with the provision of assistance such as agricultural equipment. 
The practice of patronage in the form of club goods in certain 
communities in society, and some that use more money in par- 
ticular, even these candidates collaborate both of these patron- 
 
 
  
 
age practices in order to attract the sympathy and support of the 
community. 
In addition, the pure patronage in the Ponorogo Regency is 
realized by giving money either directly or through the network 
to select candidates. Distribution of vote buying/pocket money 
and the provision of goods are often termed patronage as shown 
below: 
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Source: Compiled by the Author (2015). 
 
FIGURE 3. VOTE BUYING DISTRIBUTION FLOW 
The process of distributing money itself has a very different 
plot, starting directly with the red line community (pure), through 
a success team to the voters up through the group leader (pure) 
to distribute money to individuals within the group. Proper pa- 
tronage practices can be seen from the existence of a direct award 
from the candidate to the community without going through 
the clientelistic network (Community in the Electoral District 
6,2015). Other giving of money to individuals is mostly done by 
candidates not directly but through individual community fig- 
ures and success teams. In addition, it would be more interest- 
ing to see the distribution of money through the group for the 
individuals in it done through the Success Team and commu- 
nity leaders and directly from the candidate who is closer to the 
chairman of the group. In addition to vote buying there is also 
the purchase of votes through the election, often called “vote 
CANDIDATE 
Success Team & Local Elders 
Group Chief 
Society Election 
Organizers 
Persons in 
group 
Vote Result 
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trading.” 
The pocket money (sanggu) is distributed into two different 
ways: through intermediaries and directly to the community 
(Community in the Electoral District 2, 2015). In the intermedi- 
ary way, it can take place through the Success Team and the 
group leaders who target individuals in the group (patronage 
is clientelistic) (Community in the Electoral District 3, 
2015).The selection of youth group targets is a separate strategy 
because young people and novice selectors are very easily 
influenced by the group leader. The influence of the group 
leader on the members is proof of the high degree of 
sendikodawuh from the mem- bers to the chairperson. 
(Community in the Electoral District5, 2015). The amount of 
money is very diverse, ranging from 25,000 to 100,000/person. 
The giving of this item is often referred to as an individual gift, 
which in practice in Ponorogo is in the form of a calendar, t-
shirt,or wall clock (Community in the Electoral District 4, 
2015). In addition to the voters, there is a candidate in the 
Electoral District 6 who buys votes from the election organiz- 
ers by raising results from the votes of other candidates in one 
party. This practice was carried out in the village of Carang 
rejo in the Sampung Regency (Poling Station 12) by members 
of the PPS (jaringan.news.com, 2015),not only in the form of 
money given to the voters but also to the needy. 
The granting of this item is referred to as “club goods” 
(Aspinall, 2014). This term is used for the giving of goods to 
social groups, in contrast to individual gifts, which refers more 
to the giving of private goods to society, whereas club goods 
refers more to giving goods needed by nonmember groups. 
Youths are the group most targeted by providing assistance in 
the form of goods that can be leased to the community for the 
purpose of getting rent as group income, the goods being in 
the form of tents, generators, and other equipment 
(Community in the Electoral District2, 2015). Goods in this 
group are also given to agricultural groups because almost half 
of the land in Ponorogo is agricultural. Goods such as sickles, 
fertilizers, and rice grinding 
 
 
  
 
machines are provided (Community in the Electoral District3, 
2015). In addition to targeting young people and GAPOKTAN, 
distribution of goods in this group also targets mothers and 
mothers’ groups,women’s religious study groups, and reog art 
groups (reogart figures, 2015). 
In practice, the political patronage in Ponorogo has many 
terms such as open-openanarea inJava. The local language has be- 
come the basis of the vote of political parties and even the vote 
base of the actors. The provision of pork barreling is very bind- 
ing to the voters who are open because the culture of helping 
each other in Mataraman is highly esteemed (Harsono, 2015). 
The form of this pork barrel is the provision of road-building 
assistance, irrigation, and culvert making (The Success Team in 
the Electoral District 4). The distribution from pork barrel in 
the Ponorogo Regency is made easier with the diagram below. 
The area was given the name open-openan because this was the 
base of the vote at the previous election (The Success Team in 
the Electoral District 1, 2015). In addition, as the target of the 
goods group of the open-openan area this becomes the focus of 
pork barreling by the candidate to the constituents. Pork barrels 
are a government aid that should be distributed to those con- 
stituents who supported the previous election and usually this is 
carried out by an incumbent candidate. 
The provision of pork barrels is binding on voters in the open- 
openan areas because the culture of helping each other is highly 
respected (Harsono, 2015). The form of pork barrel is the provi- 
sion of roads, irrigation, and culverts (4). The distribution of 
pork barrels in the Ponorogo Regency is shown in Figure 4. 
The use of government funds to aid misuse as a political strat- 
egy is a form of patronage politics with pork barrels. The distri- 
bution of aspiration funds in Ponorogo Regency is generally 
carried out in two ways through the SKPD and BKAD (inter-
village cooperation councils) (The Success Team in the 
Electoral District 4,2015). First, the fund is derived through the 
regency’s agencies to work on projects in the field. The 
mechanism of this is a 
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proposal submitted directly by the community to the SKPD and 
the situation of the area is review edit can be considered. 
This first distribution method is not an option for the board 
to put its name to the project because of the work and process 
through the SKPD. Projects through the SKPD are purely re- 
viewed in the area and do not become parliamentary entrants, 
in contrast to the funds through the BKAD (The Success Team 
in the Electoral District 4, 2015). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author (2015). 
FIGURE 4. THE DISTRIBUTION OF PARK BARREL 
The second method of distribution is that funds can be dis- 
bursed through the BKAD and channeled to the accounts of 
community groups both within one region and incorporated into 
a cube consisting of at least 15 people to a member of the DPRD 
(The Success Team in the Electoral District 3,2015). A member 
of the Regional People’s Legislative Assembly gave a letter of 
rec- 
The society group who 
makes a proposal 
Agencies in 
Regency (SKPD) 
Through the broker, society brings 
the proposal to the incumbent 
legislative candidates 
Selection formulation and the 
proposal approval by the incumbent 
legislative candidates 
The assistant of the incumbent 
legislative candidates brings the 
proposal to the executive official 
BKAD 
 
(The fund is delivered to 
 
 
  
 
ommendation on the proposal submitted by the residents and 
then the proposal was brought by the personal assistant to the 
BKAD (The Success Team in the Electoral District4,2015). 
The distribution of government project funds (aspiration 
funds) utilized by Democrat Party incumbent candidates is to be 
discussed through the BKAD. Government projects that should 
be purely for the needy areas with the submission process from 
the community through the SKPD should be used by candidates 
to enter into the pork barrel project. This is done through the 
process of extending the hands of brokers and success teams to 
act as a bridge between the community and the candidate. Com- 
munication between the Success Team and communities 
greatly affects the success of a project that gets responses from 
the legislature. 
 
THE CLIENTELISM NETWORK OF THE DEMOCRAT 
PARTY IN PONOROGO REGENCY 
According to Aspinall and Sukmajati’s (2015), there are at 
least three mobilization network routes to be discussed here. First 
is the Success Team. The successful of this team is carried out by 
almost all Democrat candidates who are either in or out. 
Second are social networking machines. The candidates utilize 
public figures ranging from village bureaucrats to religious and 
cultural figures. Third is preserve political party machine. The 
Democrat candidates utilize the political machine in terms of 
cadres located at the bottom of the PAC in each village and the 
election district. 
There are the network of the Success Team, community lead- 
ers, and political parties in distributing patronage to the 
community. In the three forms of mobilization network of 
voters who have this clientelistic relation, based on the data of 
candidates of the researcher, all speakers admitted to using the 
net- work of success teams in order to win the nomination. 
Further- more, social networking machines such as community 
leaders, most of the speakers only claim to use more as a driver, 
or can be 
JURNAL 
STUDI PEMERINTAHAN 
(JOURNAL OF 
GOVERNME NT & POLITICS) 
 
 
 
 
487 
 
  
 
 
 
Vol. 8 No. 4 
November 2017n 
 
 
 
488 
 
said as people who are used for the power of community in the 
application of various forms of patronage politics, as well as some 
who use it as a network of voter mobilization. In contrast to the 
political party machine this is only used for the implementation 
of the Democratic Party’s pork barrel. First, this explanation dis- 
cusses the success team that spearheads the candidates: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Source: Compiled by the Author (2015). 
FIGURE 5. THE ROLE OF THE SUCCESS TEAM 
The candidate’s approach by always collecting success from 
mid-2012 until the 2014 election is a form of emotional approach 
to the candidate’s success team, and the formation of a Success 
Team is done by pre-empting the request of willingness such writ- 
ten agreement from the Success Team to the candidate that the 
supporting candidates entirely as well as the 2009 nomination. 
The number of success teams from the Democrat candidates 
for nominating DPRD level can be fairly selective, remembering 
that this is done to get a success team that can actually work 
for the candidate. Of course, good sorting like this avoids the 
cheating done by the success team because sometimes there is 
a double Success Team (Candidate, 2016). The form of success 
team se- lection became a candidate’s readiness to fight in the 
legislative 
Society mobilization 
Candidate 
The social group 
Success Team 
The Open- 
Openan Areas 
New and 
Risk areas 
The Success Team 
in the Village 
The group chair Elites in Society 
 
 
  
 
elections in the Ponorogo district in 2014. 
The structure of the Success Teams in this section is well or- 
ganized and tends to be stratified. The structure of theSuccess 
Teams can be said to be effective for the seizure of seats in the 
local parliament. Of course, the effectiveness of this network 
will be paid off when the candidate wins in accordance with the 
acquisition of his votes. This difference occurs because, as can 
be seen, the level of the success team from the top level is the 
success team leader who is in the district as the holder of a suc- 
cess team command on behalf of the candidate, of course. Then 
enter the next level to the Village Coordinator which is divided 
into three, so the implementation will be easy. Ease in this struc- 
ture as it is clear the duties and functions of success teams that 
are under the command of the success team of the chairman in 
the district. The task of the village coordinating team is to achieve 
success in the open-openan area and the most important is the 
task for new and vulnerable areas. Communities recruited as 
success teams also have a clear task of maintaining votes at the 
“open-pure” and community level. The most important tasks are 
derived from the group leader who is in charge of his group by 
utilizing “joint risk” in the Matraman culture. After discussing 
the next Success Team of social network which is more domi- 
nated by warokand village elites who are members of the win- 
ning team of candidates. 
Warokis  the strongest network in  Ponorogo  because of  the 
wise attitude and is obeyed by the public as the target of candi- 
dates to attract entry into the net (Candidate, 2015). Therefore, 
the blessing and assistance of warokare needed by the candidates 
to attract voters. People who are trusted by the warok community 
can contribute a lot of votes to the candidates. In addition, vil- 
lage elites such as RT to village heads become the candidate choice 
as a network because they are closest to the community (candi- 
date, 2015). The proximity of the village elite to the community 
is the second strongest network after warok. The last is the politi- 
cal machine network, where most are the heads of the village 
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where there are most members of political parties. The position 
of the village chief is considered the most ideal for networking 
because candidates can distribute pork barrels directly to the vil- 
lage head (candidate, 2016). This is what makes the village head’s 
bond with the political party very strong because it keeps the 
open-openan area as a recipient of pork barrels or club goods. 
The use of patronage is the most widely adopted patrolbecause 
the use of pure patronage is very vulnerable to its implementa- 
tion, while the disadvantage of pure clientelism is that there are 
a lot of costs borne by the candidate. So candidates prefer to use 
patronage that is clientelistic. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusion can be drawn from the results of this study 
that the Democrat candidates, first using patronage in the 
form of votes, gives outgroup goods and pork barrels. Giving 
money is targeted at communities, group members, and 
election organizers. The political money used in Ponorogo is 
termed “pocket money”of 25,000–100,000. The distribution 
of public goods in Ponorogo targets youth groups such as youth 
cadres, martial arts, GAPOKTAN, art groups, and women’s 
religious study groups. Areas with open communities are 
targeted as candidates for public goods and pork barrels such as 
roads, irrigation, and culverts. The distribution process is 
through the BKAD (inter-village co- operation agency) and is 
directly distributed to the community. Secondly, the 
clientelistic network of the Democrat Party candidates uses 
success teams, social networks, and political machinery. The 
Success Teams are set up ahead of time and have their own 
functions ranging from the chairman to village coordina- tion, 
whereas social networks are dominated by the nearest warok and 
village elite forces within the community. The politics used by 
the Democrats uses the cadre of village heads to keep the open-
openan areas. Patronage with various deficiencies and 
clientelism as well as the use of patronage that is clientelistic are 
more desirable from Democratic candidates and candidates from 
 
 
  
 
other parties. 
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